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a b s t r a c t
Fishing communities are subject to economic risk as the commercial fisheries they rely on are
intrinsically volatile. The degree to which a community is exposed to economic risk depends on a
community's ability to confront and/or alter its exposure to volatile fishery conditions through risk-
reduction mechanisms. In this article, economic risk – as measured by community-level fishing gross
revenues variability – is characterized across Alaskan fishing communities over the past two decades,
and exploratory analyses are conducted to identify associations between community attributes and
revenues variability. Results show that communities’ fishing portfolio size and diversification are
strongly related to fishing revenues variability. Communities with larger and/or more diverse fishing
portfolios experience lower fishing revenues variability. Portfolio size and diversification appear to be
related to the number of local fisheries, indicating that communities’ portfolios may be constrained to
the set of local fisheries. Hotspots of relatively higher fishing revenues variability for communities in
north and west Alaska were identified, mirroring the spatial distribution of fishery-specific ex-vessel
revenues variability. This overall pattern suggests that a community's fishing portfolio – and hence its
exposure to risk – may be “predetermined” by its location, thereby limiting the policy options available
to promote economic stability through larger and/or more diverse fishing portfolios. For such
communities, diversifying income across non-fishing sectors may be an important risk reduction
strategy, provided any potential negative cross-sector externalities are addressed.
& 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
While the majority of Alaskan commercial fisheries are sus-
tainably managed [1], Alaskan fishing communities experience a
range of social, economic, environmental, and biological stressors.
The 1996 re-authorization of the Magnuson–Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act requires that fisheries man-
agers consider the impacts of fisheries regulations on fishing
communities [2], and a pressing concern in fisheries management
is to understand the current status of fishing communities and the
mechanisms that drive community dynamics. Particular interest
lies in identifying which characteristics, if any, are associated with
a community's ability to withstand and adapt to the range of
stressors affecting fishing communities [3,4]. With knowledge of
attributes associated with fishing community resilience, managers
can identify potentially controllable factors through which policy
goals for sustainable fishing communities can be achieved, as well
as highlight communities that are particularly vulnerable as
candidates for more proactive and targeted policies.
Commercial fisheries upon which fishing communities rely are
intrinsically volatile due to variable market conditions, fluctuating
catches and stock dynamics, changes to fishery regulations, and
environmental change [5–7]. It follows that communities that are
dependent on revenue flows from these fisheries may be subject
to significant economic risk—communities are more likely to
experience periodic low revenue flows when fishing catches and
prices are highly variable due to unpredictable fishery conditions.
The degree to which a community is subject to economic varia-
bility, however, depends on a community's ability to confront
and/or alter its exposure to volatile fishery conditions through
risk-reduction mechanisms. For instance, a community may expe-
rience lower exposure to volatile fishery conditions if its revenues
flows are diversified across a variety of fisheries, similar to a
crop diversification strategy practiced by farmers [8,9]. However,
fishing communities may differ in the opportunities available to
diversify their portfolio of fishing revenue flows due to differences
in their proximity to commercial fisheries or differences in fleet
characteristics which promote or constrain participation in diver-
sified fisheries, inter alia.
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Fishing revenues are only one of the multiple dimensions
which make up fishing communities; however, characterizing
the status and drivers of economic variability is particularly impor-
tant for communities whose economic base relies on the inflow of
commercial fishing revenues, like many isolated fishing commu-
nities in Alaska [6,10–12]. The degree to which community-level
gross fishing revenues have varied over recent history has not
been systematically characterized across the state. For example, do
communities across the state experience similar revenue varia-
bility, or are there hotspots of high or low variability?
In this paper, we conduct an exploratory analysis of observed
levels of risk – i.e. the chance of experiencing a bad revenues
outcome – in Alaskan fishing communities with the following
three objectives: (i) characterize community-level fishing gross
revenues risk across Alaskan fishing communities over the past
two decades; (ii) identify associations between fishing community
attributes and revenues risk, with a particular focus on the
influence of fishing portfolios in mitigating risk; and (iii) discuss
community attributes associated with fishing revenue variability
and fishing portfolio composition in the context of natural
resource management policy and future research directions to
promote understanding of fishing community dynamics.
Diversifying fishing activity over a variety of fisheries is an
important mechanism through which fishing communities may be
able to reduce economic risk [13–16]. The benefits of having a
diversified portfolio of fishery revenue flows is analogous to the
benefits of a diversified portfolio of risky assets; diversification can
lower the variance – and thus the risk – of a portfolio's return,
potentially below the variance of the least risky asset. In general,
the larger the number of assets in a portfolio, the greater the
benefits of diversification [17]; however, the effectiveness of
portfolio diversification depends on the correlation between asset
returns. The benefits of diversification are enhanced if assets are
negatively correlated, noting that risk reduction can still occur
with positively correlated assets cf. [18]. Commercial fishermen in
Alaska have a wide range of fisheries in which they can participate,
with each fishery differing by its target species (e.g. crab, herring,
salmon, halibut), gear type (e.g. purse seine, gillnet, pot gear), and
geographic location (e.g. Bristol Bay, Prince William Sound, South-
east Alaska). The degree of diversification in a community's fishery
portfolio is therefore determined by the variety of commercial
fisheries in which its residents participate.
In a separate analysis, Sethi et al. [19] collated a database of
community-level metrics which provides information on the
status of multiple dimensions of fishing communities. Metrics
are partially or fully available for 324 Alaskan fishing communities
over 1980–2010 and include community-level information on
population, fishing opportunities, fleets, fishermen experience,
and landings. These metrics are used in exploratory analysis of
the relationship between variability in community-level fishing
gross revenues and the following fishing community attributes:
the size and diversity of a community's portfolio of fishing revenue
flows, investment into fishing vessels, geographic location and
proximity to fishing opportunities, and community demographics
such as population size and fishing tenure. While the set of metrics
used in this analysis may not fully characterize the myriad
dimensions which drive fishing communities’ revenue variability,
we contend that they provide a good starting set of attributes for
understanding the mechanisms underlying community-level eco-
nomic risk. As an example, it is expected that fishing communities
with larger fleet investments and more fishing experience would
encounter less revenue variability since newer, larger, and better
equipped vessels with more experienced captains may be able to
take advantage of peripheral fishing areas and occasions – and
thus revenue opportunities – that they would not be able to
otherwise exploit.
Regression analyses indicated that communities’ fishing port-
folio size and diversification were strongly related to community-
level fishing gross revenues variability, controlling for community
size, fleet investments, and fishermen experience. Policies which
restrict fishermen's and thus communities’ abilities to diversify
revenues flows over multiple fisheries could therefore lead to
increased risk exposure. Portfolio size and diversification appeared
to be related to the number of local fisheries, indicating that
the composition of communities’ fishing portfolios may be
constrained to the set of local fisheries. Our results indicated
hotspots of high community-level fishing gross revenues varia-
bility in north and west Alaska, with relatively lower community
levels fishing revenues variability in the southern and eastern
parts of the state, mirroring the spatial distribution of fishery-
specific ex-vessel revenues variability [5]. This overall pattern
suggests that a community's fishing portfolio – and hence its
exposure to risk – may be “predetermined” by its location, thereby
limiting the policy options available to promote economic stability
through larger and/or more diverse fishing portfolios. For such
communities, diversifying income across non-fishing sectors may
be an important risk reduction strategy, provided any potential
negative cross-sector externalities are addressed.
2. Methods
2.1. Definitions and data
Residents of Alaskan communities have a variety of state- and
federally-managed commercial fisheries in which they can
participate, spanning multiple targeted species, gear types, and
management institutions. Commercial fisheries managed by the
State of Alaska include all fisheries that occur within 3 nautical
miles (nm) from shore and a subset of fisheries in federal waters
43 nm offshore within the U.S. exclusive economic zone but for
which management is delegated to the State (e.g. crab fisheries).
State-managed fisheries are dominated by limited entry programs,
the majority of which allow the transfer of permits between
individuals through sale or bequest [20]. At present, permit leases
for state-managed fisheries are not allowed except in medical
emergencies. U.S. federally-managed fisheries in Alaskan waters
occur greater than three nautical miles offshore and are managed
by some form of limited entry (e.g. the Central Gulf of Alaska
groundfish trawl fleet) or catch share (e.g. the sablefish Individual
Fishing Quota fleet) program. State- and federally-managed fish-
eries off Alaska are prosecuted by a wide variety of vessels, ranging
from small skiffs using longlines to catch halibut, to large catcher
processors which catch and process pollock in the Bering Sea.
Under State law, Alaskan commercial fisheries are stipulated by
taxa (either a species such as Pacific herring, Clupea pallasii, or
group such as Pacific salmon, Oncorhynchus spp.), fishing district,
and gear type. Any individual that partakes in commercial activity
in state waters, including harvesting or landing catch from a state-
or federally-managed fishery, requires a fishery-specific permit
issued by the Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission
(CFEC). For example, a S03T CFEC permit is required to operate
in the salmon (S) drift gillnet (03) fishery in Bristol Bay (T), Alaska.
Overall, 20,275 CFEC permits were issued across 205 fisheries in
Alaska in 2010, 15,475 of which were held by Alaskan residents
with the remainder owned by non-Alaskan U.S. citizens. The CFEC
tracks commercial landings by permit, permit ownership, and
permit-holder residency information, and publishes data on
fishing vessels registered in the State (e.g. length and engine
horsepower). The CFEC assigns each permit-holder a unique file
number which can be used to cross-reference residency, permit
ownership, and vessel information. As such, the set of fishing
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opportunities within a community can be reconstructed by collat-
ing all CFEC commercial fishing permits registered to participants
who declare their home address in a given community.
We obtained community-level gross fishing revenues data from
publicly available databases published by the CFEC, which were
discounted to 2010USD using the Anchorage Consumer Price
Index. These revenues represent the sum of annual gross fishing
revenues attributable to CFEC permits registered to a given
community. Permitholders may participate in and make landings
in fisheries not local to their community of residence. In these
cases, some landings revenues may ultimately remain at the place
of the fishery, for example through municipal landings taxes if
levied or through local fleet services; however, we presume the
bulk of fishing revenues return to fishermen's communities of
residence. CFEC community-level fisheries revenues data do not
include catches in the U.S. federally-managed groundfish fisheries
for which the harvest is not landed in an Alaskan port. The number
of such fisheries across the state are few and are dominated by
large catcher processors owned by out-of-state firms; thus, their
direct impact is restricted to a small number of Alaskan fishing
communities (e.g. Dutch Harbor and Kodiak). Finally, State con-
fidentiality restrictions prevent publication of catch or revenues
information for fisheries for which there are fewer than four
participants. As a result, these very small fisheries are excluded
from our data.
We define an Alaskan community as a named settlement as
recorded by the Alaska Division of Community and Regional
Affairs (available at www.commerce.state.ak.us), and define a
“fishing community” as a community with fishing rights and
which derives some economic or social benefit from commercial
fishing (cf. U.S. Magnuson–Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act; [2]). The Community and Regional Affairs
division publishes a list of 396 communities as having existed in
Alaska since statehood in 1959; however, complete or partial
commercial fishing revenues, commercial fishing permit, per-
mitholder, and vessel information necessary to construct fishing
community attribute metrics were available for a subset of 324
communities.
Fishing community attribute information was taken from pub-
licly available data sources including the CFEC (www.cfec.state.ak;
landings gross revenues by community, community attributes),
the U.S. decennial census data (www.census.gov) as published by
the Alaska Division of Community and Regional Affairs (available
at www.commerce.state.ak.us; community attributes), and the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (available at www.bls.gov; Anchorage
Consumer Price Index for revenues deflation). Fishing community
attribute information is available on an annual basis (further
details provided in [19]).
Fishing community attributes proposed as potentially being
associated with fishing community gross revenues variability
represent a balance between a priori research questions (see
above) and data availability. Measured community attributes
considered for inclusion into subsequent regression modeling
included information on: (i) community size: population; (ii) and
(iii) fishing portfolios: number of different fisheries in which
community members participated and Simpson's diversity index
[21] for the portfolio of active fisheries; (iv) fleet investment: sum
of length of vessels registered to a community per active fisher-
man; (v) a proxy for fishermen skill and experience: years of
commercial fishing tenure (years of owning at least one CFEC
fishing permit) for permitholders in a community; and (vi) and
(vii) location: community latitude and longitude.
We considered a community fishing portfolio to be the set of
fisheries in which members of the community operate, where a
portfolio “asset” is a fishery. Because catch and price outcomes are
stochastic, fishing communities do not directly select their fishing
revenues outcomes; however, fishing community members do
make decisions to seek out permits in one or more fisheries and, if
they have access to multiple permits, in which fisheries to
participate. Thus, in a given year, the number of a community's
active permits participating in a given fishery represents the
ex ante weighting for that “asset” in a fishing portfolio, whereas
the sum of annual landings gross revenues generated from com-
munity members’ participation in the fishery represents an ex post
portfolio outcome. For what follows, portfolio size is defined as the
number of different fisheries in which residents of a community
participate, and portfolio diversification is measured with Simp-




for k active fisheries in a community where pi is either the
proportion of total active permits in a community participating
in fishery i when considering ex ante portfolio diversification (not
all permits are fished in every year), and the proportion of a
community's annual fishing revenues attributable to fishery i
when considering ex post portfolio diversification.2 Simpson's
diversity index ranges from 0 to 1.0, with higher values indicating
less diversification. While ex ante portfolio construction reflects
communities’ anticipation of fishing outcomes, thereby influen-
cing community fishing gross revenues by defining the number
and weightings of active fisheries in a portfolio, financial risk is
ultimately the result of realized revenue outcomes. For regression
analyses (see below), we therefore chose to examine the associa-
tion between community-level fishing gross revenues and ex post
portfolio diversification; regression analyses using the ex ante
version of portfolio diversification, are provided in the online
Supplementary materials (Fig. S1) and resulted in analogous
conclusions to those presented below.
2.2. Community-level annual fishing revenues variability measures
We characterized annual revenues variability over a twenty
year period from 1990–2010. Variability was measured using the
coefficient of variation (CV) and conditional value at risk (CVaR;
e.g. [22,23]; see below), and implemented using custom functions
written in R [24] following Sethi and Dalton [25]. The length and
timing of the study period was chosen based upon several factors.
First, simulation analyses with data modeled after historical
Alaskan commercial fisheries revenues suggest that a sample size
of at least 10–15 data points is desirable for characterizing
variability over a time period using the CV and CVaR [25]. We
therefore restricted our analysis of gross revenues variability to
those communities with at least 10 years of revenues data over
1990–2010, resulting in 110 communities with sufficient revenues
data. Second, the study period occurs after the last major Pacific
decadal oscillation and the associated reorganization of Alaskan
marine ecosystems [26]. Third, state-wide community analyses
[19] indicate that most communities experienced a peak in catch
and revenues in the later 1980s; the period of 1990 onwards
captures the decline from the peak as well as a more recent
recovery period and provides good contrast to identify whether
2 Note, fishermen may operate in more than one fishery in a community, but
because commercial fishing permits are specific to a taxa-gear-area combination,
the ex ante portfolio diversification measure does not double count active permits.
For example, consider a small community with 10 active permits in one fishery,
5 active permits in another, and 5 active permits in a third and final fishery. While
some permitholders may operate in multiple fisheries in the community, a unique
permit must be employed for each respective fishery, such that p¼{10/20, 5/20, 5/
20}¼{0.5, 0.25, 0.25} In this case, the ex ante portfolio diversification measures is
0.52þ0.252þ0.252¼0.375.
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some communities experience less drastic swings in revenues over
this period.
The CV, ν, is defined as:
ν¼ sμ ð2Þ
where s and μ are the standard deviation and mean, respectively,
of a random variable (here, a community's annual fishing gross
revenues). The CVaR, ϕ, focuses on the magnitude of extreme bad
events. It is the expected outcome conditional on being in the α%
worst case scenarios, i.e. α% worst realizations of outcomes for a
random variable:





where F and F1 are the cumulative and inverse cumulative
probability functions for the distribution describing the outcome
behavior of the random variable R (with outcomes r). We used an
alpha level of 25%. Analogous to the coefficient of variation, CVaR
was scaled to the sample mean to facilitate comparison across
communities with revenues of different scales. Finally, the CVaR
measure in mean units was subtracted from 1.0 to indicate the
expected downside outcome distance from the mean, in mean
units. Scaled CVaR, ϕ, is:
ϕ¼ 1ϕx ð4Þ
where x is the sample mean for a series of revenues. Scaled CVaR
ranges on [0,1]. For example, calculated as above using 25% CVaR
(henceforth referred to as CVaR25), a ϕ measure of 0.55 indicates
that an outcome that is 55% less than the long term mean is
expected in one in four years.
2.3. Statistical analyses
We analyzed the association between community attributes
and fishing gross revenues variability as measured by CV and
CVaR25 using random forest regression [27,28]. Separate regres-
sion analyses were carried out for the two variability measures.
Community attribute information is available on an annual basis
and we used the arithmetic mean value across the study period to
generate a single data point per community per attribute for
subsequent regression. Because risk measure information – i.e. the
dependent variable in regression analyses – represents a summary
statistic across a set of annual data for a community, panel
methods of regression were not available [29]. Only those com-
munities with at least seven years of regressor data over the study
period for all attributes under consideration in the study were
retained for regression modeling. Thus, regression analyses were
conducted with the subset of fishing communities satisfying both
revenues variability (10 or more data points) and attribute data (7
or more data points) thresholds, for a total of 84 communities. We
also conducted analyses using an attribute threshold of 10 years,
which reduced the subset of permissible communities to 79, and
found analogous regression and model selection results to those
reported below (results not shown but available from the authors
upon request).
Random forest regression was employed because the estimator
does not require any parametric distribution assumption be made
for the response variable (here, CV or CVaR25) and because it is a
flexible estimator which can elucidate complex potentially non-
linear relationships between regressors and the response variable
[5]. In order to pick a parsimonious best approximating model, we
used a model selection routine based on cross validation and
random forest variable importance as detailed in Sethi et al. [5].
Briefly, the procedure works as follows:
Step 1: Fit the global model using the full set of community
attributes as predictor variables, and compute permutation-
based random forest variable importance measures which
assess the relative importance of different predictors in the
model in explaining variability in the response data (revenues
variability). Also compute the mean squared error for model
predictions in the random forest fitting procedure.
Step 2: Drop the least important variable and fit the model.
Step 3: Iterate Step 2 until only two variables remain.
Step 4: Choose as the best model the largest model within þ1
standard deviation from the lowest mean square error model.
This selection procedure results in a balance between model
complexity and model fit, while accounting for variability in
generating the variable importance measure in nonparametric
regression [28,30,31].
The relationships between predictors and the response data, as
estimated by the best performing random forest regression model,
are represented visually through partial dependence plots [32,33].
A partial dependence plot depicts the marginal relationship
between a single regressor and the response variable by integrat-
ing over all model predictions while holding the variable of
interest constant at a prescribed value. This procedure is repeated
for all values of the predictor variable of interest. The results are
subsequently plotted to characterize the marginal relationship
between the predictor variable of interest and the dependent
variable while accounting for the influence of all other predictor
variables. We implemented the random forest regressions with the
randomForest package [33] in the R statistical programming
environment [24]. We set the number of trees in the random
forest to 50,000, the number of variables to try at splits within
regression trees to 3, and observed data were sampled without
replacement during forest construction.
Regression analyses considered models without interactions or
higher order terms. Modeling began by first examining regressors
for collinearity. The total number of active fisheries in a commu-
nity (i.e. fishing community portfolio size) was moderately corre-
lated with population (correlation¼0.70) and Simpson's index for
fishing portfolio (ex post) diversification (correlation¼0.78);
however we chose to retain total number of active fisheries
because collinearity was not severe and because it plays a central
role in exploring the relationship between portfolio size and
diversification with fishing revenues variability.
3. Results
3.1. Revenues variability summary
Alaskan fishing communities experienced a wide range of
fishing gross variability over 1990–2010 (Fig. 1; Table S1). The
three most stable communities – as ranked by both CV and CVaR25 –
had community-level annual gross revenues CV of 15% or less and
CVaR25 of 20% or less, the latter indicating that for those commu-
nities, a worst case outcome was characterized as o20% reduction
from the long term mean in one in four years (i.e. 80% of mean or
better expected in 3 of four years). The three least stable commu-
nities had gross revenues CV above 120% and CVaR25 above 90%,
the latter indicating that in one in four years, these communities
expect annual fishing gross revenues to be 90% below the long
term mean level.
By visual inspection (Fig. 1; Table S1), communities in the
southeast region of the state tend to experience less risk in terms
of the occurrence of both typical and extreme bad events. Indeed,
four of the top five most stable communities in terms of gross
revenues CV, and all five of the top five most stable communities
S.A. Sethi et al. / Marine Policy 48 (2014) 134–141 137
in terms of CVaR25 were from the southeast region of the state. In
contrast, the least stable communities were dispersed across the
northern and western parts of the state.
3.2. Regression analysis
Model selection supported dropping the proxy for fishermen
experience and skill (i.e. mean tenure in commercial fisheries) for
both gross revenues CVaR25 and CV information, but retention of
all other covariates. The best fit models explained 64.2% and 55.5%
of the variation in fishing gross revenues CVaR25 and CV informa-
tion amongst communities, respectively.
Both regression analyses indicate that the size of communities’
active fishing portfolios (Fig. 2a, number of fisheries) and the ex
post degree of diversification of fishing portfolios (Simpson's
diversity index of fishing gross revenues, Fig. 2b) had the strongest
association with community-level annual fishing gross revenues
variability. After controlling for location, population size, and fleet
investments, regression models suggest a strong effect of declining
revenues variability with increasing fishing portfolio size and
diversification. Partial dependence plots indicate that an increase
from a small number of active fisheries (e.g. from 2 to 10 fisheries)
has the largest impact on reducing risk (Fig. 2a). In contrast, the
effect of portfolio diversification appears to be more approxi-
mately linear with each additional increment of diversification
resulting in comparable variability reduction (Fig. 2b). All things
the same, regression results suggest that a community with
5 active fisheries in its portfolio would have 35% greater gross
revenues CVaR25 and 20% greater gross revenues CV than a
community with 25 active fisheries. Similarly, a minimally-
diversified community would have 30% greater gross revenues
CVaR25 and 25% greater gross revenues CV than a maximally-
diversified community.
The third strongest association identified was between commu-
nities’ location and gross revenues variability, with an increasing
variability gradient moving west across the state (Fig. 2c), although
partial dependence plots indicated a threshold effect where the
association of longitude with revenues variability became weak for
communities east of about 150 1W (approximate longitude for
Anchorage, AK). Regression analyses also supported an increasing
variability gradient moving north across the state, however, the
association was considerably weaker than for an east to west
gradient (Fig. 2e).
Communities’ investments into fleets, as measured as the sum
of vessel length per active fishermen, were also associated with
gross revenues variability, where communities with more boat per
fisherman were associated with lower gross fishing revenues
variability (Fig. 2d, sum vessel feet/fisherman). Community size
as measured as (natural log) population was retained in both
models for fishing gross revenues CVaR25 and CV; however, the
predicted association was weak (Fig. 2f), indicating that all things
the same, community-level fishing gross revenues variability and
population size were largely decoupled.
4. Discussion
A growing body of work has demonstrated that portfolio size
and diversification play a role in stabilizing output, such as revenues
or biomass, in natural resource systems [13,35–37]. The gross
fishing revenues variability communities experienced over the
1990–2010 study period ranged dramatically across the State, and
evidence based upon the sample of fishing communities in this
study indicated that both portfolio size and diversification play
important roles in stabilizing community-level fishing gross reven-
ues. Certainly portfolio size and diversification are not the only
factors which influence community-level fishing gross revenues
variability—in fact, we found evidence that communities with more
invested into their fishing fleets were associated with lower fishing
gross revenues variability, potentially as bigger and more numerous
boats allow for greater catching power and/or access to a wider
range of fishing revenues opportunities. After controlling for the
effects of population size, investments into fleets, and geographic
location, however, portfolio size and diversification remained most
strongly associated with community-level fishing revenues varia-
bility. Population size and operator skill had little to no association
with community-level fishing gross revenues variability.
While the benefits of larger and more diversified portfolios for
stabilizing revenues flows are clear, there are a number of reasons
why fishing communities may differ in the size and diversity of
their fishing revenue portfolios, chiefly that portfolio makeup and
performance may be constrained by the set of local fishing
opportunities. Fishermen can travel to operate in fisheries outside
of their local community of residence, providing a strategy to
expand and diversify communities’ fishing portfolios beyond the
set of local fisheries; however this strategy incurs additional travel





























Fig. 1. Community-level annual fishing gross revenues coefficient of variation (a) and 25% conditional value at risk (b). Data are shown only for communities with 10 or
greater data points over 1990–2010 (n¼110). Breakpoints correspond to quintiles. Boxplots show a summary of the state-wide data with notches indicating the median
metric value and 95% confidence interval [34].
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and time costs, particularly for remote communities or fishing
locations, and may require larger seaworthy vessels. When mapped
across the State, the size of community-level fishing portfolios
appears to be related to the number of local fisheries, with commu-
nities inland on rivers and communities in northern and western
parts of the state having smaller portfolios than communities in the
fisheries-rich southern and eastern regions of the state (Fig. 3).
Regional patterns in portfolio diversification also follow this trend
(Fig. 4), suggesting that communities’ fishing portfolios are influ-
enced by the set of local fisheries available for participation. It
follows that communities’ fishing revenue variability will be largely
influenced by the variability patterns exhibited by local fisheries, as
suggested by the regional differences in our regression analyses,
with southern and eastern communities tending to have more
stable revenues than northern and western communities. Indeed,
this spatial gradient amongst communities’ revenues variability
mirrors trends in risk at the fishery level whereby northern and
western fisheries tend to be more volatile than southern and
eastern fisheries [5].
The metrics used in this analysis may not fully characterize the
multiple dimensions in which fishing portfolios may drive fishing
communities’ revenue variability. For instance, portfolio theory
suggests that an “active” portfolio management style – whereby
portfolios are often revised in response to market conditions – may
outperform a “passive” management style if active managers are
able to consistently select assets that outperform the market [38]. In
the context of this study, some Alaskan fishing communities do

































































Fig. 2. Partial dependence plots for random forest regression of community-level fishing gross revenues (GR) coefficient of variation (gray lines and text) and 25% conditional
value at risk (black lines and text) measures against fishing community attributes. Plots are ordered from highest to lowest by random forest regression variable importance,
measured as the % increase in mean squared error after randomly permuting values of a given predictor. Tick marks above the x-axis denote observed values for a respective
predictor. Regression variables: (a) portfolio size (number of fisheries), (b) portfolio diversification (ex post, Simpson's index on community level fishing gross revenues),
(c) community longitude, (d) index for fleet capital intensity (sum of feet of vessel length per active permitholder), (e) community latitude, (f) community population size
(natural log of population).
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Fig. 3. Community fishing portfolio sizes based upon the number of active
fisheries. Data are mean values across years and include only those communities
with 7 or greater data points over 1990–2010 (n¼239). Breakpoints correspond to
quintiles. Boxplots show a summary of the state-wide data with notches indicating
the median metric value and 95% confidence interval [34]. Crosshairs represent the
approximate centers of fishing activity for Alaskan State-managed commercial
fisheries over the study period (cf. [5]).
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year to year variation in the number of active fisheries (Fig. 5a) and
in their ex ante portfolio diversification (Fig. 5b). Conversely, some
communities exhibit a more “passive” portfolio management style
with consistent numbers of active fisheries year to year and con-
sistent diversification thereof. Incorporating measurements of port-
folio management style into our analyses, however, is complicated
by the fact that our proxies for management style – as measured by
the CV of active fisheries and the CV of ex ante portfolio diversifica-
tion over the sample period – suffer from: (i) imperfect measures
of active or passive management, relative to measurements such
as turnover rates used for evaluating mutual fund investment
performance; and (ii) high collinearity with the set of predictors
in our regression analysis. The role of portfolio management style in
community-level fishing performance and variability remains an
open question.
The data analyzed in this study demonstrate that the size and
diversification of a community's fishing portfolio affects annual
gross fishing revenues variability, and thereby presents an avenue
through which fishing communities can reduce their exposure to
economic risk. Policies that create entry barriers to commercial
fisheries could therefore increase fishing communities’ exposure
to economic risk by impeding community residents from partici-
pating in a variety of fisheries. On the other hand, some commu-
nities may face inherent constraints on the set of fisheries with
which to construct a portfolio of opportunities, particularly in
regions of the state with fewer and more volatile local fisheries.
The implication of this is that some communities may have limited
ability to benefit from larger and/or more diverse fishing portfo-
lios, limiting the policy options available to promote economic
stability through larger and/or more diverse fishing portfolios.
Furthermore, communities with location-constrained portfolio
opportunities may be particularly susceptible to policies that affect
catch or price variability, and alternative strategies for reducing
exposure to economic risk may need to be considered instead.
For instance, policies that promote new harvesting opportunities
can provide a means for communities to increase the size and
diversification of their fishery portfolio. Similarly, economic diver-
sification can be enhanced through policies that facilitate the
development of industries outside of wild capture fishing, thereby
reducing fishing communities’ dependence on commercial fishing
revenues. We caution, however, that policies that promote the
development of non-fishery sectors need carefully consider any
potential negative externalities that may affect a community's set
of fishing opportunities. For example, while aquaculture may
provide a community with economic opportunities outside of
capture fisheries, nearby wild fish populations may be at risk from
parasites from farmed seafood pens [39]. In other cases, extractive
resource harvest of minerals or timber can degrade fisheries
habitat, potentially reducing the productivity of wild fish stocks
[40–42]. Such negative externalities are therefore counterproduc-
tive and may attenuate – or in extreme cases, nullify – the benefits
of diversifying outside of wild capture fishing.






























Fig. 4. Simpon's diversity index for communities’ fishing portfolio diversification based upon fishing gross revenues (ex post diversification, (a) and permit activity (ex ante
diversification, (b). In both cases, a “portfolio asset” is a commercial fishery, however, portfolio weights for (a) are community total gross revenues for a given fishery, and for
(b), portfolio weights are the number of active permits in a given fishery. Data are mean values across years and include only those communities with 7 or greater data points
over 1990–2010 (Simpson's index by gross revenues portfolios: n¼120; by active permits: n¼214). Breakpoints correspond to quintiles. Boxplots show a summary of the
state-wide data with notches indicating the median metric value and 95% confidence interval [35]. Crosshairs represent the approximate centers of fishing activity for
Alaskan State-managed commercial fisheries over the study period (cf. [5]).






















Fig. 5. Histograms of communities’ coefficient of variation (CV) in (a) portfolio size
(number of active fisheries, and (b) in portfolio diversification measured as
Simpson's index based upon active permits (ex ante portfolio diversification) across
1990–2010. Data are coefficient of variation across years; only communities with
7 or more years of data during the study period are shown (active fisheries:
n¼204; Simpson's index based upon active permits: n¼214).
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